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Rethinking the State 
Sovereignty Interest in  
Personal Jurisdiction 
Jeffrey M. Schmitt† 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court has never articulated a coherent theoretical 
justification for the law of personal jurisdiction. While some opinions 
state that the law is based on state sovereignty, others hold that it is 
instead derived exclusively from the Due Process Clause’s concern for 
fairness. None of the opinions, however, clearly ties either of these theor-
ies to the blackletter law of personal jurisdiction. This confusion over 
the purpose of the doctrine has helped to create divisions both within 
the Court and among the Circuits on a number of important jurisdic-
tional issues. 
This Article argues that the law of personal jurisdiction must take 
sovereignty into serious account and provides a new interpretation of 
how sovereignty should inform the doctrine. Sovereignty must be con-
sidered because, when a court exercises jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant, the state projects its sovereign power outside of its borders. 
The Court has imposed significant constitutional limitations on a state 
that projects its regulatory power beyond its borders, and analogous 
constitutional limitations should apply to a state court’s assertion of 
adjudicatory power over an out-of-state defendant. 
Using the scope of a state’s regulatory power as a guide, this Article 
contends that the inherent limits of state sovereignty can explain much 
of the Court’s modern personal jurisdiction doctrine. Most significantly, 
a regulatory model supports the requirement that the defendant—
rather than merely the case—have minimum contacts with the forum 
state. Sovereignty, however, cannot explain all aspects of the doctrine. 
The purposeful availment requirement, for example, is tied to the sub-
jective intentions of the defendant rather than the sovereign power of 
the states. Understanding how sovereignty influences the doctrine high-
lights the fact that some other constitutional value, such as fairness or 
liberty, must be at play. 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I would like 
to thank Michael Alan and the participants at the SEALS New Scholars 
Workshop, as well as Brad Shannon and the participants at the Florida 
Coastal Scholarship Exchange, for providing many helpful comments on this 
Article. 
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Introduction 
Although personal jurisdiction is perhaps the most fundamental 
subject in Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has never articulated a 
coherent account of its theoretical underpinnings. In particular, the 
Justices have been unable to agree on whether the doctrine is based, 
even in part, on state sovereignty. Most recently, in J. McIntyre Mach-
inery, LTD. v. Nicastro,1 Justice Kennedy called state sovereignty a 
“central concept,”2 whereas Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, asserted that 
jurisdictional rules “derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty.”3 The stakes of this debate are unclear, because the Court 
has never explained exactly what impact, if any, sovereignty has on the 
doctrine.4 This hopeless confusion over the role of sovereignty has help-
ed to create divisions both within the Court and among the Circuits on 
 
1.  131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
2.  Id. at 2788 (plurality opinion). 
3. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court also famously switched 
positions on the role of sovereignty in the early 1980s. In World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court asserted that 
the doctrine is based in part on the need to ensure that states “do not reach 
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns 
in a federal system.” Id. at 292. Just two years later, however, the Court in 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, LTD v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 
U.S. 694 (1982), stated that the doctrine is exclusively “a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause” rather than 
“federalism concerns.” Id. at 702 n.10. 
4. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of 
Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open By Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. 
Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 618 
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a number of basic jurisdictional issues, making the modern law of per-
sonal jurisdiction frustratingly unsettled.5 
Most scholars of jurisdiction have rejected state sovereignty as a 
meaningful basis for personal jurisdiction.6 They generally argue that, 
while state sovereignty explains why state lines matter, the substance 
of the doctrine should be derived exclusively from the Due Process 
Clause’s concern for fairness. Many of these scholars therefore argue 
that the doctrine should be based solely on the convenience of the par-
ties,7 the defendant’s consent,8 or fair play resulting from the election 
 
(2012) (“[A]ppeal to sovereign authority does nothing to distinguish one 
case from the other.”). 
5. See, e.g., Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107, 109–110 (2015) (“The Supreme 
Court has failed to agree on an analysis for specific jurisdiction cases involving 
limited forum contacts, and it has not resolved cases involving loosely related 
claims. Both gaps in doctrine stem from a single source—the failure to 
establish a coherent theory of specific jurisdiction.”); Allan R. Stein, The 
Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 
533 (2012) (“As the Court replaced a doctrine built on physical presence 
with one based on minimum contacts, it never adequately developed the 
conceptual underpinnings of the new foundation. This failure has caused 
profound confusion in both specific and general jurisdiction.”); George 
Rutherglen, International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 347 (2001); Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive 
Due Process: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on International 
Shoe and its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969 (1995) (“Unfortunately, 
confusion between the federalism thread and the substantive due process 
thread has been a major source of the inconsistency and confusion in United 
States personal jurisdiction law.”). 
6. See sources cited infra note 46. 
7. See Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: 
A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1115 (1981) (suggesting 
a new due process test using “three factors: the degree of inconvenience that 
a defendant would suffer in being forced to litigate in a distant forum, the 
degree of inconvenience a plaintiff would suffer in being forced to proceed in 
a different forum, and the state’s interest in having its own law resolve the 
controversy”). 
8. See Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1–2 (2001) (“[T]he consent of the parties to select 
this or that sovereign to resolve their dispute best explains the overall 
situation [of jurisdiction].”); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989) (“[T]he 
Court should have instead grounded its federal common law of jurisdiction 
on the principle of political consent.”). 
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of benefits in the forum.9 A number of scholars even argue that consti-
tutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction are unjustified and should 
be abandoned altogether.10 
This Article, however, argues that state sovereignty should be seen 
as a basic theoretical justification for the constitutional restrictions on 
personal jurisdiction. Although other scholars have recognized that sov-
ereignty should play some role,11 this Article directly responds to sover-
eignty’s critics and advances a new argument for its consideration based 
 
9. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 4, at 625–26 (“[T]he exercise of 
judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws.’” (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., LTD 
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011))). 
10. See, e.g., James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial 
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 277–282 
(2004) (arguing that jurisdictional rules should be seen as federal common 
law rather than constitutional law); Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of 
the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 532 (1995) 
(“One solution [to stem the flood of jurisdictional litigation] is to dismantle 
the many barriers to personal jurisdiction erected under the supposed aegis 
of the Constitution and interfere only in the unlikely event that a state 
court has offended basic concepts of fairness to absent defendants.”); Jay 
Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1994) (arguing that the current approach to jurisdiction 
should be ended because “the law of jurisdiction is anachronistic [and spurious] 
due process jurisprudence”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Consti-
tutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back 
Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 20 (1990) (stating that the Court should 
“abandon the notion that state court personal jurisdiction is a matter of 
constitutional law, and relinquish its role as the final authority on the general 
ability of state courts to reach beyond their borders”). 
11. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward 
a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 
264–65 (2014) (arguing that the Court’s personal jurisdiction “framework must 
give due regard to the state’s regulatory and adjudicatory interests”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 617, 620 (2006) (stating that state sovereignty is one factor “central 
to determining adjudicatory jurisdiction”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument 
and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. 
L. REV. 689, 689–90 (1987) (arguing that “assertions of jurisdiction . . .  
ought to reflect the general limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal 
system” and that interstate federalism plays a “central and unavoidable role” 
in jurisdictional decisions); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 85 (1980) 
(“[I]t is possible to make purely structural arguments in defense of sovereignty 
limitations which would be persuasive even if the Due Process Clause did 
not exist.”). 
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on a comparison to a state’s regulatory jurisdiction.12 By borrowing 
principles from the regulatory context, this Article further contributes 
to the scholarly discussion by developing an original interpretation of 
how state sovereignty informs the doctrine. In sum, this Article con-
cludes that, as a matter of state sovereignty, a state court may exercise 
jurisdiction only over a defendant that engaged in conduct that signifi-
cantly implicated interests within the sphere of the state’s sovereign 
power, that is, the health, safety, and general welfare of its people.13 
Putting sovereignty into focus could help to resolve some of the 
most intractable issues in personal jurisdiction. For example, sovereign-
ty helps to explain why the Court focuses on the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum state, an approach that has troubled many scholars.14 
Understanding the theoretical basis of the doctrine could also guide the 
courts in a number of concrete doctrinal issues that are currently divid-
ing the Justices and the lower courts.15 This Article focuses on the str-
eam of commerce issue that prompted the Court’s most recent debate 
over sovereignty in Nicastro. Although Justice Kennedy’s plurality op-
inion purported to rely on sovereignty, his restrictive approach to juris-
diction in the stream of commerce context is not based on the inherent 
limits of the sovereign power of the states. Notwithstanding his assert-
ions to the contrary, Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore must be based 
on dubious fairness concerns regarding out-of-state corporate defend-
ants that benefit from sales in the forum state. 
 
12. This Article focuses on sovereignty and does not address how fairness concerns 
tied to the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause may also limit juris-
diction. 
13. This conclusion marks a significant break from other scholars who have 
considered the role of sovereignty. Drawing on a parallel to the rules governing 
choice of law, these scholars have concluded that a state should have the 
power to assert jurisdiction whenever the case implicates a state interest. 
See sources cited supra note 11. This Article, however, argues that the state 
must have an interest, not just in the case, but in the conduct of the defendant. 
14. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 4, at 618 (“[W]hat McIntyre and 
Goodyear lack is an explanation of the connection between the individual 
defendant’s interests and the sovereign’s.”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem 
with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 130 (2001) (“First, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of its “purposeful availment” test often 
denies plaintiffs in tort cases access to the most rational forum--in other 
words, the state of the injury.”); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining 
the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 919 (1995) 
(arguing that the Court “took a wrong turn” when it decided to “focus[] 
primarily (and sometimes exclusively) on the question of whether an out-of-
state defendant had ‘purposefully availed’ herself of the benefits or privileges 
of the forum state”). 
15. For an excellent discussion of such unresolved jurisdictional issues, see 
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11. 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the stage by explaining 
how the Court has discussed the state sovereignty interest in personal 
jurisdiction. Part II argues that state sovereignty should be seen as a 
necessary theoretical justification for the constitutional law of personal 
jurisdiction and responds to academic arguments to the contrary. Part 
III argues that a regulatory model for understanding sovereignty is sup-
erior to the choice of law model used by other scholars and provides a 
general outline of how sovereignty should inform the constitutional 
doctrine. Part IV applies this understanding to the stream of commerce 
issue in Nicastro. 
I. The Supreme Court’s Consideration of  
State Sovereignty 
The Supreme Court first stated that the Constitution restricts the 
power of state courts to assert jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff.16 The 
Court in Pennoyer asserted that, because “[t]he authority of every tri-
bunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in 
which it is established,” a state court could not constitutionally assert 
jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant who was not served within 
the state.17 Pennoyer’s territorial framework was therefore justified by 
the inherent territorial limits of a state’s sovereignty.18 The Court used 
the Due Process Clause as the textual hook for its constitutional doct-
rine by reasoning that, if a state court lacked jurisdiction, any resulting 
decision would violate Due Process.19 Because the contours of the indivi-
dual right protected by Due Process were wholly defined by the power 
of the state, sovereignty occupied center stage under the Pennoyer 
framework.20 
When the Court rejected Pennoyer’s rigid territorial framework in 
International Shoe,21 it provided no clear theoretical basis for its new 
 
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Although the courts had enforced jurisdictional limits 
on state courts through U.S. history, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical 
Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485 (2013), 
Pennoyer was the first case to explicitly state that these limitations derived 
from the Constitution. 
17. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720, 722. A state court, however, could assert juris-
diction based on property located within the forum. Id. at 723. 
18. Id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty 
over persons and property within its territory.”). 
19. Id. at 733. 
20. See Borchers, supra note 10, at 63 (asserting that the Pennoyer framework 
“was the result of ancient notions of sovereignty”). 
21. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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approach to personal jurisdiction.22 The Court famously held that “due 
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment 
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he 
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”23 But what are “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice”? The Court references party convenience,24 reciprocal benefits 
arising from “the privilege of conducting activities within a state,”25 and 
“the context of our federal system of government.”26 The Court there-
fore did not clearly embrace or reject Pennoyer’s reliance on state sov-
ereignty.27 
To this day, the Court has never presented a coherent account of 
whether or how state sovereignty informs the law of personal juris-
diction. In Hanson v. Denckla,28 the Court explained that the consti-
tutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are a consequence of terr-
itorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”29 The Court 
in Shaffer v. Heitner,30 however, asserted that “the mutually exclusive 
sovereignty of the States” was no longer the “the central concern of the 
inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”31 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. 
Woodson32 then changed course again and, echoing Pennoyer, stated 
that a key function of the doctrine is “to ensure that the States through 
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
 
22. See Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreword, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 518–19 
(1995) (noting that “[t]here is still no clear test”). 
23. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). 
24. Id. at 317. 
25. Id. at 319. 
26. Id. at 317. 
27. See Perschbacher, supra note 22, at 518 (“International Shoe has never 
completely fulfilled its promise to provide an adequate general theory of 
state-court jurisdiction.”); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1982) (“Unlike Pennoyer, 
there is a marked absence in International Shoe of any discussion about the 
forum state infringing upon the interests of other states or harming federalism. 
The opinion's requirement of contacts with the forum state, however, does 
conform with Pennoyer's emphasis on territorial sovereignty.”). 
28. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
29. Id. at 251. 
30. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).  
31. Id. at 204. 
32. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction 
776 
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”33 Just two years 
later, however, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee34 inexplicably rejected World-Wide’s analysis.35 The Court 
asserted: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function 
of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction 
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism 
concerns.36 
One scholar summed up these cases by asserting that “the Court has 
accepted, then rejected, then accepted, then rejected, and then accepted 
the ‘federalism’ or ‘sovereignty’ factor in the jurisdictional calculus.”37 
The debate over the role of sovereignty recently reemerged in J. 
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro.38 In a plurality opinion, Justice Kenn-
edy flipped the reasoning of Insurance Corp. of Ireland on its head. 
Ireland had argued that, by directly protecting individual liberty, the 
doctrine incidentally limited sovereignty. Kennedy, however, asserted 
that state sovereignty, not fairness, was “central.”39 He explained that 
the liberty interest protected by Due Process was the “individual’s right  
33. Id. at 292. The Court also asserted that the doctrine acts “as an instrument 
of interstate federalism.” Id. at 294. 
34. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).  
35. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 10, at 68 (“As quickly as the ‘sovereignty’ 
rationale came back into fashion in World-Wide, it went out of style in 
the Court’s opinion next term in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.”). 
36. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10. Following this reasoning, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Burger King omits any reference to sovereignty and 
states: “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest 
in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has 
established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Many subsequent decisions 
focus on whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum without 
discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the minimum contacts doctrine. 
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., LTD. v. Superior Court of Cali., 480 U.S. 
102, 108–09 (1987) (“‘The constitutional touch-stone’ of the determination 
whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process ‘remains 
whether the defendant purposefully established “minimum contacts” in the 
forum state.’”) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 
(1985))). 
37. Borchers, supra note 10, at 78 (footnotes omitted). 
38. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
39. Id. at 2788. 
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to be subject only to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is 
lawful,” he asserted, “depends on whether the sovereign has authority 
to render it.”40 According to Kennedy, although the doctrine is tech-
nically grounded in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, its 
content is derived solely from state sovereignty considerations. His op-
inion therefore resurrects World-Wide Volkswagen’s focus on sover-
eignty as a fundamental animating principle behind the law of personal 
jurisdiction.41 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nicastro, which was joined by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, rejected Kennedy’s reliance on state sovereign-
ty.42 According to Justice Ginsburg, “the constitutional limits on a state 
court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due pro-
cess, not state sovereignty.”43 She further explained that “[t]he modern 
approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ush-
ered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fair-
ness.”44 Because neither approach could garner a majority,45 Nicastro 
did nothing to clarify the role of sovereignty within the law of personal 
jurisdiction. 
II. Sovereignty as a Theoretical Justification  
for Personal Jurisdiction 
The legal academy is also sharply divided over the theoretical basis 
of personal jurisdiction, including the proper role of state sovereignty. 
Most scholars contend that sovereignty should not be seen as an anima-
ting principle behind the doctrine and suggest a preferred alternative, 
such as convenience, consent, or fair play.46 Several scholars, however,  
40. Id. at 2789 (citation omitted). 
41. Kennedy further asserted that “if another State were to assert jurisdiction 
in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits 
that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion 
by other States.” Id. 
42. Id. at 2794. 
43. Id. at 2798. 
44. Id. at 2800. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Daimler uses similar 
language. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (“Following 
International Shoe, ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on 
which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into 
personal jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 
45. Justices Breyer and Alito issued a concurring opinion that did not stake out 
a position on state sovereignty. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
46. See, e.g., Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 Vand. L. 
Rev. 501, 533 (2015) (asserting that “sovereignty does not meaningfully 
contribute to an analysis” of when a court has jurisdiction); Wendy Collins 
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have bucked this trend and argued that sovereignty is fundamental.47 
These scholars recognize that an assertion of jurisdiction is an exercise 
of state power that requires some justification. This Section further 
develops this argument by drawing from the analogous context of reg-
ulatory jurisdiction and by directly responding to sovereignty’s critics. 
A. The Affirmative Case for Considering Sovereignty 
When a court exercises jurisdiction, it issues a summons and comm-
ands the defendant to appear or face a default. Regardless of whether 
the defendant appears, the court may then issue a judgment that has 
profound consequences for the defendant, including the loss of property 
or liberty. No private actor has such power.48 Instead, this power over 
 
Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 729, 734 (2012) 
[hereinafter Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?] (“It is true 
that the cases include frequent references to ‘sovereignty’ and ‘federalism,’ 
but these words have little analytic significance.”); Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 
Tul. L. Rev. 567, 631 (2007) (arguing that “the Due Process Clause itself 
does not independently protect federalism”); Goldstein, supra note 5, at 966 
(“The Article concludes by proposing that the Supreme Court abandon the 
federalism thread altogether . . . .”); Borchers, supra note 10, at 20 (arguing 
that the Court should abolish all constitutional limitations on personal juris-
diction); Drobak, supra note 27, at 1017 (“Although the requirement of 
minimum contacts serves useful purposes, I conclude that the preservation of 
federalism and state sovereignty is not one of them.”); Epstein, supra note 8, 
at 1–2 (“In my view, the consent of the parties to select this or that sovereign 
to resolve their dispute best explains the overall situation.”); Redish, supra 
note 7, at 1137 (“[T]he only concern of a principled due process jurisdictional 
analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the defendant.”); Robert 
H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the 
Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 75, 76 (1984) (“[F]ed-
eralism issues raised by judicial assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are 
more appropriately resolved by Congress.”); Russell J. Weintraub, Due 
Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for 
Change, 63 Or. L. Rev. 485, 503 (1984) (“The time has come to remove 
the federalism cloud from due process limitations on state court jurisdiction 
so that the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement can be examined in the clear 
light of fairness to the defendant.”); Trangsrud, supra note 8, at 853 (arguing 
that jurisdiction should be based on notions of consent rather than territorial 
power); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the 
Box, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 529, 561 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (arguing that 
personal jurisdiction doctrine should address issues of “convenience, bias, 
and choice of law” rather than sovereignty or legitimacy); Conison, supra note 
10, at 1190 (“To persist in believing that sovereignty and interstate federalism 
are concerns of due process is to perpetuate illogic and confusion.”). 
47. See sources cited supra note 11. 
48. Although the parties could consent to private arbitration, the authority of 
the arbitration award would be based on such consent. 
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the defendant is a component of the state’s sovereignty,49 or “supreme 
political authority.”50 In our system of government, every exercise of 
sovereign power must have some justification. 
The process of identifying the source of the government’s authority 
is familiar in the subject of constitutional law. The federal government 
is a government of limited powers, and every exercise of power must be 
tied to an enumerated power in the Constitution. A federal district 
court therefore may exercise jurisdiction only when authorized to do so 
by a federal statute, and all such statutes must be passed pursuant to 
a power granted to Congress in the Constitution. The Constitution, in 
turn, derives its authority from the people of the United States, the 
ultimate source of federal sovereignty. The sovereign authority of the 
people—and thus, by implication, the federal district courts—therefore 
applies throughout the country. 
State sovereignty, however, does not derive from the people’s 
ratification of the Constitution.51 Instead, the Constitution grants limit-
ed sovereign powers to the federal government and places restrictions 
on the power of the states.52 As Alexander Hamilton asserted in Federal-
ist No. 32, after Ratification, “the State governments would clearly 
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which 
were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United Sta-
tes.”53 The Tenth Amendment confirms what was already implicit in 
the system: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”54 
 
49. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786–87 (noting that it is “the power of a sovereign 
to resolve disputes through judicial process . . . [and] to prescribe rules of 
conduct for those within its sphere”).  
50. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “sovereignty” as “[s]upreme 
dominion, authority, or rule,” and further defines “state sovereignty” as 
“[t]he supreme political authority of an independent state.” Sovereignty, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1524 (9th ed. 2009). 
51. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(“The same does not apply to the States, because the Constitution is not 
the source of their power.”). 
52. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American 
Federalism 159 (2010) (discussing communications between Madison and 
Jefferson regarding the division of powers granted to the federal government 
and the states). 
53. The Federalist No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). James 
Madison similarly stated that the Constitution was “party federal and party 
national” because it “leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty over all other objects” not delegated to the federal government. 
The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison). 
54. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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Wholly apart from the ratification of the Constitution, the people 
of each state granted sovereign power to the states.55 This local source 
of sovereignty places significant limitations on state power. Whereas 
the power of the federal government is limited by the scope of its enum-
erated powers, the power of each state is inherently limited by the scope 
of legitimate authority of the people of each state. Each state’s police 
power—its “general power of governing”56—includes only the power th-
at the people of each state have the ability to grant.57 In other words, 
while federal power is limited by subject matter, state power is limited 
by geography. The people of Virginia, for example, cannot grant the 
state of Virginia a general power of governing over Maryland.58 
A state court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an in-state defendant is 
therefore easy to justify from the standpoint of state sovereignty. Just 
as a state’s police power justifies regulation of in-state conduct, its 
police power also authorizes the assertion of adjudicatory power within 
the state. In other words, if the people of Virginia can regulate a defend-
ant’s conduct while he is in Virginia, they also have the sovereign power 
to authorize a lawsuit against a defendant in Virginia. 
Because of the limited geographical scope of the state’s police 
power, however, it is more difficult to justify a state’s assertion of sov-
ereignty—whether regulatory or adjudicatory—over an out-of-state 
defendant. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he limits on a Sta-
te’s power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on 
the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, ‘any attempt “directly” 
to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would 
offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State’s pow-
er.’”59 The rules governing a state’s extraterritorial power in the regula-
tory context can therefore inform how state sovereignty operates in the 
 
55. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 325 (1816) (“[T]he powers of 
the states depend upon their own constitutions . . . .”); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, 
In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 Okla. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016). 
56. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.  
57. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428–29 (1819). In M’Culloch, the 
Court held that Maryland could not tax the federal bank in part because 
the people of Maryland did not have the power to authorize Maryland to 
effectively tax the nation. Id. at 429–430 (“[W]e measure the power of 
taxation residing in a State, by the extent of sovereignty which the people of 
a single State possess, and can confer on its government.”). 
58. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827–28 (1975) (asserting that “Virginia’s 
police powers do not reach” “activities outside Virginia’s borders”). 
59. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). See also J. McIntyre Mach. LTD v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s 
right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful 
power. . . . This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to 
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context of adjudicatory jurisdiction. In both situations, the state is 
using its police power, which derives from the people of the state, to 
control things outside of the state. Because the limitations on state 
sovereignty are based on geography rather than subject matter, the 
scope of a state’s regulatory and adjudicatory power should be similar. 
In the regulatory context, the Supreme Court has held that a state 
cannot directly regulate conduct “that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders.”60 In other words, a state may not “project its legis-
lation into [other States],”61 or “attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over persons or property.”62 This limitation on state 
regulatory power is derived from the dormant Commerce Clause and 
“the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority.”63 
This seemingly simple prohibition on extraterritorial state regula-
tory power, however, has proven as difficult for the Court to apply as 
its rules for personal jurisdiction.64 The reason is simple: even if a state 
regulation directly applies only to in-state conduct, virtually every state 
regulation has some effects beyond its borders. The Court has struggled 
to draw a line between permissible and unconstitutional extraterritorial 
effects, resulting in a confusing line of cases that is open to drastically 
 
resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a 
sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”). 
60. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642. See also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) 
(same); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) (“[I]t is clear 
that no single State could . . . impose its own policy choice on neighboring 
States.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 
U.S. 573, 584 (1986) (holding a New York statute invalid in part because it 
improperly “directly regulated commerce” in other States). 
61. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583–584 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 
294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)). 
62. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).  
63. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. See also BMW, 517 U.S. at 572 (citing “principles 
of state sovereignty and comity”). Other scholars have likewise found that 
the extraterritorial doctrine is based on notions of sovereignty. See Katherine 
Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extra-
territoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1057, 1060, 1093 (2009); David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extra-
territoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 
1, 40 (1992). 
64. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s 
Progressive Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not 
Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 423, 
424 n.3 (2015) (collecting sources claiming that the prohibition on extra-
territorial regulation is confusing and incoherent) [hereinafter Schmitt, 
Extraterritoriality]. 
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different interpretations.65 For example, while applying this doctrine, 
the Court upheld a state regulation requiring shareholder approval be-
fore a change in control of a company chartered under the laws of the 
state,66 but struck down a law that required approval for a company in 
which at least ten percent of the shareholders were state residents.67 
Lower courts have upheld in-state labelling requirements that had the 
practical effect of forcing companies to change their national labelling 
practices,68 but struck down regulations requiring a company selling in-
state products to change their labeling practices in other states.69 
Although Part III of this Article will argue that these cases can be 
reconciled, the point for present purposes is that, whenever a state’s 
sovereign power reaches beyond its borders, serious and difficult issues 
of state sovereignty follow. 
State sovereignty concerns are equally applicable to the assertion 
of adjudicatory power over an out-of-state defendant as to the extra-
territorial application of state regulatory power. Just as Virginia lacks 
the authority to regulate the rest of the country, it also lacks the power 
to force the people of the United States to submit to its courts. When 
a Virginia court asserts jurisdiction over a citizen of Maryland and com-
mands him to appear, some justification for Virginia’s exercise of sover-
eign power is needed. Each state’s adjudicatory power is derived from 
its police powers, and, like in the regulatory context, the police powers 
granted by the people of Virginia do not typically extend into Mary-
land. 
The constitutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction therefore 
must take sovereignty into account in a serious and substantive way. 
Although nothing in the text of the Constitution explicitly limits the 
jurisdiction of state courts based on sovereignty or federalism concerns, 
the Constitution is not the relevant source of authority. The structure 
of federalism in the United States, and especially the source of the sov-
ereign power of the states, unquestionably limits the power of a state 
to regulate extraterritorial conduct. This same reasoning dictates that 
the scope of state sovereignty must limit a state’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 
 
65. Id. at 440 (arguing that lawyers and courts have interpreted the rule to 
mean that extraterritorial effects are always impermissible, never present 
constitutional difficulties, and various positions in between). 
66. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987). 
67. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 627, 646. 
68. Nat’l Elec. Mfr. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2001). 
69. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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B.  Responding to Sovereignty’s Critics 
Most legal scholars, however, contend that state sovereignty is not 
a meaningful theoretical basis for the constitutional law of personal 
jurisdiction.70 Four major lines of argument emerge from the literature. 
First, scholars contend there is no historical support for using sovereign-
ty or federalism concerns to impose constitutional limitations on state 
court jurisdiction because, at least prior to Pennoyer, the law of juris-
diction was part of the common law rather than constitutional in nat-
ure.71 Under this argument, federalism concerns should be left to Con-
gress, which has the power to rewrite the jurisdictional rules.72 
Legal history, however, strongly supports a sovereignty-based app-
roach to jurisdiction. The requirement of jurisdiction is older than the 
Constitution73 and, even after Ratification, was understood to be a func-
tion of both “eternal principles of justice” and the inherent limits of 
state sovereignty.74 As Justice Story held in Picquet v. Swan,75 “no sov-
ereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial limits, to subject 
either persons or property to its judicial decisions.”76 Leading nineteenth  
70. See sources cited supra, note 46 
71. Redish, supra note 7, at 1123 (“Judicial decisions recognizing limitations 
on the reach of a state’s personal jurisdiction in the pre-Civil War United 
States were not based on constitutional principles.”); Borchers, supra note 
10, at 23 (“[P]rior to Pennoyer the Court treated personal jurisdiction as a 
matter of federal common law.”); Conison, supra note 10, at 1076. 
72. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 278 (“[B]y mistakenly casting common law 
federalism concerns as dictates of constitutional law, the Court has arrogated 
to itself power that, under our constitutional scheme, properly belongs to 
Congress.”); Goldstein, supra note 5, at 966 (“[T]he allocation of personal 
jurisdiction among the states—cannot be remedied by sporadic case law 
decisions, but rather requires a comprehensive legislative solution.”); Abrams 
& Dimond, supra note 46, at 87 (“This Article contends that the ultimate 
responsibility for resolving federalism concerns over state courts’ extra-
territorial jurisdiction should rest not with the Supreme Court but with 
Congress, a body institutionally better equipped to legislate federalism out-
comes that are sensitive to the needs of the states.”). 
73. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 
20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 485, 492 (2013) (discussing cases) [hereinafter 
Schmitt, Full Faith and Credit]. 
74. Id. at 517 (quoting Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813) 
(Johnson, J., dissenting)). See also Weinstein, supra note 10, at 185 
(quoting Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 486 (1813) (Johnson, 
J., dissenting)) (“Among these all-but-immutable precepts was . . . the rule 
‘that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a state . . . over persons 
. . . not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their limits.’”). 
75. 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). 
76. Id. at 612. See also Lincoln v. Tower, 15 F. Cas. 544, 546 (C.C.D. Ill. 1841) 
(No. 8,355) (“[I]f, upon the face of such record, a want of jurisdiction appears, 
it cannot be received as evidence. It does not bind the defendant, nor can 
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century treatises likewise stated that a state’s sovereign power, include-
ing its power to assert jurisdiction, did not extend beyond its borders.77 
Pennoyer’s heavy reliance on state sovereignty as an animating princi-
ple of personal jurisdiction was merely a continuation of a long and 
consistent historical practice.78 
Although nineteenth century jurists did not tie the doctrine of juris-
diction to any particular textual provision, Pennoyer’s grounding of the 
doctrine in the Constitution is fully justified.79 Long before textualism 
gained prominence in the law, nineteenth century jurists believed that 
universal and “eternal principles of justice”80 like jurisdiction were as 
fully enforceable against the government as the explicit text of the Con-
stitution.81 Scholars have therefore been too quick to argue that the lack 
 
it conclude his rights. The laws of every empire have force only within its 
own limits.”); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 448 (Pa. 1844) (“Juris-
diction of the person or property of an alien is founded on its presence or 
situs within the territory. Without this presence or situs, an exercise of 
jurisdiction is an act of usurpation.”) For cases stressing the individual rights 
justification behind the requirement of jurisdiction, see Schmitt, Full Faith 
and Credit, supra note 73, at 517–18. 
77. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States § 1307, at 183 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“The constitution 
did not mean to confer a new power or jurisdiction; but simply to regulate 
the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within 
the territory.”); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 100 
(New York, O. Halsted 1827) (“The force of the [sovereign power of the states] 
cannot be permitted to operate beyond the limits of the territory, without 
affecting the necessary independence of nations.”); 2 J. I. Clark Hare & 
H. B. Wallace, American Leading Cases: Being Select Decisions 
of American Courts 818 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 4th 
ed. 1857) (“[A]lthough the operation of a judgment as evidence, may extend 
indefinitely, its effect as a remedy, cannot reach beyond the boundaries of 
the sovereignty in which it has its origin, or the jurisdiction of the court by 
which it is pronounced.”). 
78. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 10, at 208–09. 
79. Scholars have debated whether the doctrine was actually made constitutional 
law in Pennoyer or in later cases. See Borchers, supra note 10, at 37–38 
(“Commentators, and more recently the Court, have . . . referred to the due 
process discussion [in Pennoyer] as ‘dictum’ . . . .” ). For the purposes of 
this article, it is sufficient to note that the Court eventually made the juris-
dictional rules into a constitutional requirement. 
80. Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
81. See G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition, Profiles 
of Leading American Judges viii–xi (3rd ed. 2007) (“[M]any provisions 
of the Constitution included terms, such as ‘contracts,’ ‘commerce,’ ‘speech,’ 
‘due process,’ and ‘equal protection,’ whose meaning in individual cases 
was not self-evident. In those cases the techniques of the oracular judge was 
to infuse the terms with background assumptions drawn from principles of 
natural law, political economy, or social organization.”); Rhodes, supra 
note 46, at 583 (“[D]ue process was not typically invoked in the antebellum 
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of a textual mooring makes the consideration of sovereignty a subconst-
itutional rule that is alterable at will by Congress. In fact, during the 
nineteenth century, cases and treatises asserted or implied that Cong-
ress had no power to alter state court jurisdiction.82 This makes sense 
when jurisdiction is viewed through the lens of sovereignty, because, at 
this time, the widely accepted theory of “dual sovereignty” posited that 
Congress had no power to limit or expand state sovereignty.83 Moreover, 
the Court has constitutionalized numerous other structural principles 
without a clear textual basis for doing so, especially in the context of 
state sovereignty and federalism.84 
Congress is also not the appropriate branch of government to make 
broad rules regarding the scope of state power. The Constitution divid-
ed sovereignty between the federal government and the states, leaving 
the Supreme Court, not Congress, as the ultimate arbiter of the division 
of sovereign power.85 Giving Congress a general power to limit the scope 
of state judicial power—an important aspect of state sovereignty—
 
period as the foundation for the then-existing substantive limitations on 
governmental authority, which were thought to proceed from natural or 
fundamental ‘principles of justice’ rather than a specific textual constitutional 
provision. Hence, the fact that the courts had not established a strong link 
between personal jurisdiction and due process during the antebellum period 
does not indicate that personal jurisdiction is not a species of substantive 
due process.”).  
82. See Lincoln v. Tower, 15 F. Cas. 544, 546 (C.C.D. Ill. 1841) (No. 8,355) 
(Opinion by McLean, J. while riding circuit) (“It will not be contended by 
any one, that the constitution or law enlarges the jurisdiction of the state 
court. The power to do this is not conferred on the federal government.”); 
Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 451 (Pa. 1844) (“Certainly [the 
Constitution] was not intended to legitimate an assumption of extra-
territorial jurisdiction which would confound all distinctive principles of 
separate sovereignty . . . .”); Thomas R. R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the 
Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America §§ 205–212 
(Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1858) (“Congress can give no effect 
to a judgment in another State, which it did not have under the laws of the 
State where rendered.”); Schmitt, Full Faith and Credit, supra note 73, at 
521 (arguing that, although its language is confusing, Story’s Commentaries 
on the Constitution states that Congress cannot change jurisdictional rules 
created by the Court). 
83. See 1 Alfred H. Kelly et al., The American Constitution: Its 
Origins and Development 201–02 (7th ed. 1991); The Federalist No. 
39 (James Madison) (asserting that the states have “inviolable sovereignty”).  
84. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2024–25 (2009). 
85. See LACROIX, supra note 52, at 164 (“By adopting the Supremacy Clause 
. . . the delegates turned . . . toward a vision of federal authority that relied 
not on legislatures but on judges and courts to mediate among disparate 
sources of law.”); cf. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 519 (1858) (holding that 
the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter between state and federal power). 
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would therefore violate the separation of powers envisioned by the 
framers. In sum, there is ample historical support for the consideration 
of sovereignty within a constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.86 
In a second line of argument, scholars also argue against consider-
ation of sovereignty by pointing out that the textual basis for personal 
jurisdiction is the Due Process Clause, which protects the liberty of 
individuals rather than state power.87 This critique is also unconvincing. 
The Due Process Clause limits the sovereign power of the states by 
prohibiting them from denying “life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”88 As the Court explained in Pennoyer, an individual 
has a liberty interest in being free from the sovereign power of a state 
that lacks jurisdiction.89 In this way, restrictions on state sovereignty 
are “a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due 
Process Clause.”90 In other words, defendants have a liberty interest in 
not being coerced by a state that lacks sovereign authority, just as they 
have a liberty interest against unjustified coercion by other state actors. 
When a state court hears a case over which it lacks jurisdiction, it has 
acted without valid sovereign authority. The defendant can then use 
the vehicle of the Due Process Clause to challenge the state’s invalid 
assertion of power. Although framed in liberty, the substance of the 
individual right is therefore defined by the scope of state sovereignty.91 
 
86. Moreover, there is a strong argument that none of Congress’s enumerated 
powers authorize Congress to create jurisdictional rules for state courts. Relying 
on Congress’s commerce power is dubious given the rule from Lopez and its 
progeny that Congress may only regulate economic activity. United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). I have argued elsewhere that Congress has no 
such power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Schmitt, Full Faith 
and Credit, supra note 73, at 530–32, 543–44. 
87. See Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 361–62 (noting that the Court’s conclusion 
that “[t]he restrictions on personal jurisdiction” stem from territorial 
limitations “has trouble explaining how territorial limitations are connected 
to the Due Process Clause, which the Court invokes to restrain state power”); 
Drobak, supra note 27, at 1033 (“The amendment does not say a word about 
protecting state sovereignty or federalism.”); Redish, supra note 7, at 1114 
(“[N]otions of federalism as limitations on the reach of personal jurisdiction 
are found nowhere in the body of the Constitution, much less in the terms of 
the due process clause.”); Borchers, supra note 10, at 78 (“The suggestion in 
Pennoyer that due process has anything to do with the territorial reach of 
state courts was ill-considered.”); Conison, supra note 10, at 1188 (“And, most 
problematic, [the Court] has never explained why concerns with federalism 
should be read into the Due Process Clause.”). 
88. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
89. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
90. Ins. Corp. of Ir., LTD. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 n.10 (1982). 
91. As Stein contends, “Due process protects the sovereign interests of other 
states, but only incidentally, through its protection of the individual from 
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The second argument against serious consideration of sovereignty there-
fore boils down to nothing more than semantics. 
Third, scholars argue that federalism concerns serve no meaningful 
role and have muddled the doctrine.92 Admittedly, there is some truth 
to the argument that sovereignty complicates the doctrine; however, 
the complexity of the sovereignty argument does not mean that it can 
be ignored. It is fundamental that the government must have some 
justification for every exercise of its coercive power. Moreover, the re-
mainder of this Article argues that sovereignty plays a significant role 
in shaping the blackletter law. 
Fourth and finally, scholars have asserted that sovereignty is irrele-
vant because “[c]ourts do not compare sovereign interests when decid-
ing jurisdictional issues”; instead, courts focus on the interests of the 
defendant.93 This last argument misconceives the role of sovereignty in 
the jurisdictional analysis. Although the weighing of state interests is 
common in choice of law, an area that is often compared to personal 
jurisdiction, a state’s power to regulate extraterritorial conduct provid-
es a much better comparison. Because the doctrine in the regulatory 
context does not use the interest analysis of choice of law, we should 
not expect to find such weighing of interests in personal jurisdiction. 
As explained in the following Section, the nature of state sovereignty 
implies that personal jurisdiction should be subject to significant consti-
tutional limitations. 
III. Sovereignty’s Implications for  
Personal Jurisdiction 
Legal scholars have essentially divided into two camps on the ques-
tion of how sovereignty affects the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. 
First, a number of scholars contend that “[d]espite the Court’s talk 
 
illegitimate assertions of state authority. Legitimacy, though, is defined by 
reference to the state’s allocated authority within the federal system.” Stein, 
supra note 11, at 711. 
92. Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?, supra note 46, at 737; 
Trammel, supra note 46, at 532–33; Brilmayer & Smith supra note 4, at 618; 
Borchers, supra note 10, at 63; Conison, supra note 10, at 1190. 
93. Drobak, supra note 27, at 1065. See also Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got 
to Do with It?, supra note 46, at 737 (“Despite the Court’s talk about 
federalism and sovereignty, these concepts do not do any analytic work in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, and neither the state nor state sovereignty are at 
the center of its analysis.”); Trammel, supra note 46, at 532–33 (“But despite 
the constitutive role that [sovereignty] plays in defining judicial power; it 
does very little analytical work in answering specific questions.”); Brilmayer 
& Smith, supra note 4, at 618 (“[I]t is difficult to see sovereignty as the lynch-
pin of personal jurisdiction because nothing in the concept of sovereignty itself 
explains what is at stake for individual liberty.”). 
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about federalism and sovereignty, these concepts do not do any analytic 
work.”94 According to these scholars, because the substantive rules of 
personal jurisdiction are based on defendants’ liberty interests, not the 
interests of the states, sovereignty cannot explain the modern doctrine 
and its focus on the defendant.95 The Justices mention sovereignty only 
because defendants’ liberty interests constrain the judicial power of the 
states.96 Under this view, to the extent that sovereignty has any effect 
on the doctrine, it merely explains why state borders matter in the 
jurisdictional analysis. 
Second, several scholars have argued that jurisdictional rules based 
on sovereignty should mirror a court’s choice of law analysis.97 In the 
choice of law context, a state court has the constitutional authority to 
apply the substantive law of any state that has “a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”98 Mod-
ern choice of law analysis then looks to see which state has the greatest 
 
94. Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?, supra note 46, at 737. 
See also sources cited supra note 46. 
95. See Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 4, at 625 (“If notions of federalism and 
state sovereignty are to play a critical role in the future of personal jurisdiction, 
they will either have to be tied to individual interests, or the doctrine will 
have to undergo substantial change.”); Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got 
to Do with It?, supra note 46, at 737–38 (“[T]he reality of modern personal 
jurisdiction doctrine—that it was no longer a state-centered doctrine, but 
defendant-centered instead.”). 
96. See Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?, supra note 46, at 741 
(“[D]efendants have a liberty interest in not being subject to the governmen-
tal authority of a state with which they have not affirmatively affiliated them-
selves.”). 
97. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 264–65 (“As the core attribute 
of internal sovereignty is power over those within the sovereign’s boundaries, 
a state without such regulatory authority is not truly sovereign. The state’s 
adjudicative authority should thus encompass those circumstances in which 
it has legislative jurisdiction to prescribe rules of conduct for nonresidents 
affiliating with the forum.”); Spencer, supra note 11, at 636, 658–59 (“A closer 
affinity between choice-of-law analysis and the law of jurisdiction is desirable 
because significant differences between a state’s authority to enact legislation 
applicable to a dispute and its authority to adjudicate that dispute make little 
sense.”); Stein, supra note 11, at 742–43 (“When the application of forum law 
cannot advance that interest, few conflicts approaches select forum law. 
Similarly, when the assertion of jurisdiction cannot implicate the welfare of 
person within the state’s borders, a court should decline the plaintiff’s invit-
ation to adjudicate the controversy.”). Because these scholars all look to choice 
of law rules for guidance, they reach conclusions regarding the types of state 
interests that would justify jurisdiction that differ from those of this Article. 
Most importantly, unlike this Article, they conclude that there is no link 
between sovereignty and the Court’s focus on the contacts of the defendant. 
98. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). 
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interest in the case, while often placing a thumb on the scale in favor 
of the forum state.99 Applying this choice of law paradigm, these schol-
ars contend that a state court has the power to exercise jurisdiction 
whenever it has a sufficient interest in the case.100 According to these 
scholars, the modern doctrine is far too restrictive as a matter of sover-
eignty, because a state will often have a strong interest in cases where 
the defendant lacks minimum contacts.101 The Court’s defendant-cen-
tric approach, they contend, can therefore only be justified by notions 
of consent or reciprocity from the Due Process Clause. 
Both of these approaches to state sovereignty are wrong. Choice of 
law is not the best model for evaluating the scope of a state court’s 
adjudicatory power; instead, the Court’s regulatory jurisdiction provid-
es a superior paradigm. And, if sovereignty in the adjudicatory context 
were treated the same as sovereignty in the regulatory context, it would 
have major ramifications for the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. 
A.  Rejecting the Choice of Law Model 
As more fully explained above, because a state’s sovereignty is der-
ived from the people of the state, a state generally cannot project its 
regulatory or adjudicatory power beyond its borders. This explains why 
traditionally a state court could not exercise jurisdiction over an out-
of-state defendant or regulate a person’s out-of-state conduct. As the 
Supreme Court’s has held, “[t]he limits on a State’s power to enact 
substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of 
state courts. In either case, ‘any attempt “directly” to assert extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States 
and exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.’”102 Although Inter-
national Shoe abandoned the strict requirement of in-state presence, it 
did not abandon the idea that an exercise of jurisdiction, like the applic-
ation of a regulation, is an exercise of sovereign power. The only differ-
ence between adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction is the branch of 
state government—judicial or legislative—that is exercising sovereign-
ty. However, the inherent limitations on the scope of state sovereignty 
are based on geography rather than subject matter. The scope of a 
state’s adjudicatory and regulatory power should therefore be the same.  
99. See Stein, supra note 11, at 739–48 (discussing choice of law analysis). 
100. See sources cited supra note 11. 
101. See sources cited supra note 11. 
102. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). See also J. McIntyre Mach., LTD. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s 
right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful 
power. . . . This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to 
resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a 
sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.”). 
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Choice of law is very different. When a state court takes jurisdiction 
over a defendant, the state exercises its sovereign power by forcing the 
defendant to appear or face a default. The state does not relinquish its 
sovereign power over the defendant when it uses its choice of law analy-
sis to apply the law of another state. According to “local law theory,” 
because state law has no direct force beyond its borders, when a court 
uses choice of law to apply the substantive rules of another state, the 
court “enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its own law.”103 
In other words, the court is applying forum law dressed up to look like 
the law of another state. Regardless of its choice of law decision, the 
forum court is therefore exercising the sovereignty of its own state. In 
the analogous context of Erie, it is apparent that, when a federal court 
applies state law in a diversity case, the federal sovereign power is 
nevertheless at play and must be justified. The same is true in a hori-
zontal choice of law problem—the forum state exercises its sovereign 
power over the defendant regardless of what substantive law it applies. 
The issue in a choice of law problem is whether a state court, as a 
matter of respect for the policies and interests of another state, should 
exercise its discretion to apply that state’s law, not whether the sover-
eign power of a sister state will somehow control the forum court. Unlike 
 
103. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws 21 (1942). The basic idea of local law theory is widely 
accepted among conflicts scholars. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: 
The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1821, 1843 (2005) (“[T]he theory is hard to deny; that a forum 
will sometimes apply a ‘rule of assimilation’ and shape its law to mirror the 
substance of foreign internal law is an important insight.”); Stanley E. Cox, 
Razing Conflicts Facades to Build Better Jurisdiction Theory: The 
Foundation—There is No Law but Forum Law, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(1993) (“In reality, a state can only create and apply its own law.”); Harold 
G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law, 
44 Vand. L. Rev. 827, 843 (1991) (book review) (“If the decision is the law 
in the case, then in this sense forum law is always applied, even though the 
forum court may look to foreign rules or principles to find guides for its 
decision.”); cf. Rhodes, supra note 46, at 623 (“Courts are themselves law-
makers, fashioning legal standards embodied in their judgments to provide 
guidance for future controversies, either when applying the common law or 
interpreting the statutory law from their own state or from another state.”). 
Local law theory is primarily associated with Walter Wheeler Cook, but its 
basic insight was accepted by both Justice Joseph Story and Joseph Beale, 
the major pre-modern thinkers in choice of law. See Roosevelt, supra, at 
1842–1843, n.73 (discussing Cook and Beale regarding the local law theory). 
Although some scholars have disparaged local law theory as a truism of little 
value, they do not dispute its validity. See Larry Kramer, Return of the 
Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 998 (1991) (“Lacking a comprehensive 
alternative vision, the local law theorists also lacked the conceptual tools 
necessary to decide how to treat foreign choice-of-law rules. Hence, their 
solutions are similarly question begging.”). 
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adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction, choice of law is not about the 
scope of a state’s sovereign power.104 
Although the Supreme Court has imposed constitutional restrict-
ions on a state court’s discretion to apply its own law, these rules are 
not based on the scope of state sovereignty.105 Originally, before the 
Due Process Clause applied to the states, there were no constitutional 
restrictions on a state’s choice of law.106 At the same time that sov-
ereignty was at its apex in the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction (i.e., 
the Pennoyer framework), it was therefore seen as irrelevant to choice 
of law. Although the Court has subsequently held that the Constitution 
places limitations on a state court’s choice of law, these constitutional 
restrictions are remarkably toothless.107 Under the modern doctrine, a 
state must have “a significant contact . . . creating state interests, such 
 
104. See Rhodes, supra note 46, at 623 (“Choice-of-law limitations cannot 
preclude this inherent regulatory lawmaking function of the courts or limit 
their extraterritorial reach—only personal jurisdictional limitations can.”). 
105. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State 
Power: State Regulation, Choice of Law, and Slavery, 83 Miss. L.J. 59, 
107 (2014).  
106. See Rhodes, supra note 46, at 620. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 225, 246–47 (2000). In his highly influential Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws, Justice Story argued that if the “sovereign will” of the 
state demanded that the case be resolved under forum law, the state court 
must apply forum law regardless of the circumstances. Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, In 
Regard to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially In 
Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, and Judgments 
§ 23 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Company 1834) (“When both [the state’s 
statutes and the common law] are silent, then, and then only, can the question 
properly arise, what law is to govern in the absence of any clear declaration 
of the sovereign will.”). The state had the power to determine which substan-
tive law to apply because, according to Story, “[i]t is an essential attribute 
of every sovereignty, that it has no admitted superior, and that it gives 
the supreme law within its own domains on all subjects appertaining to 
its sovereignty.” Id. at § 8. A state court therefore “cannot be commanded 
by another” state to recognize or enforce its laws. Id. As another influential 
commentator, Chancellor James Kent, explained, “[I]f a statute . . . was to 
have the same effect in one state as in another, then one state would be 
dictating laws for another, and a fearful collision of jurisdiction would instantly 
follow.” 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 100 (1827). 
Although Story believed a state court should consider the interests of other 
states, a decision to apply the law of a different state would only have been 
a matter of “comity.” Story, supra, at § 29, § 36.  
107. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Atlantic Marine and Choice-of-Law Federalism, 
66 Hastings L.J. 617, 626 (2015) (arguing that the Court essentially gives 
the states free reign in choice of law); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and 
Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 444 (1982) (calling the test 
“minimal scrutiny”). 
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that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”108 
Much to the chagrin of some conflicts scholars, the Court does not act-
ively police state choice of law decisions, and, unlike in the regulatory 
context, it has very little concern, if any, for state sovereignty.109 
A concrete example may help to demonstrate why choice of law 
does not provide the best model for determining when a state has the 
sovereign power to adjudicate a case. Suppose a Virginia court exercises 
jurisdiction over a case, applies the law of Maryland, and issues a judg-
ment against the defendant. The judgment has legal force within Vir-
ginia only because the people of Virginia have given such power to its 
courts. This exercise of Virginia’s judicial power must be justified, whol-
ly apart from the question of what law may apply. The Virginia court’s 
decision to apply the substantive law of Maryland does not change this 
analysis, because the judgment is still an exercise of Virginia’s sovereign 
judicial power. The Virginia court merely borrowed legal standards 
from Maryland to guide the court’s exercise of sovereignty.110 Virginia’s 
 
108. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 
313 (1981)).  
109. Although the Court has cited the Full Faith and Credit Clause in this context, 
the Court’s focus is on providing fair notice to the defendant and protection 
against arbitrary state action under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., David 
A. Linehan, Due Process Denied: The Forgotten Constitutional Limits on 
Choice of Law in the Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 
2012 Utah L. Rev. 209, 213 (2012) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause has 
lost its significance as an independent constraint on choice of law, effectively 
becoming redundant to the protections of due process.”); Florey, supra note 
63, at 1080–81 (stating that fairness to the defendant is the Court’s central 
concern). The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require any particular 
choice of law system or otherwise import sovereignty considerations into the 
doctrine. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: 
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 
297 (1992) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause thus assumes the existence of 
choice-of-law rules, but it does not specify what those rules are.”); Caleb 
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 
594 (2003) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause makes sense only in conjunction 
with choice-of-law rules specifying which state’s statutes control which 
issues . . . [M]embers of the founding generation expected the necessary 
choice-of-law rules to come from the general law of nations . . . .”). I have 
argued elsewhere that the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application to state 
“acts” has no bearing at all on choice of law; instead, it represents an 
evidentiary rule that requires a state court to accept the statutes of another 
state into evidence as conclusive evidence of the applicable law in that state. 
See Schmitt, Full Faith and Credit, supra note 73, at 531–32. 
110. By the same token, no one would think that an arbitrator who borrowed 
substantive legal standards from Maryland was somehow wielding the 
sovereign power of Maryland. Instead, the arbitrator’s power is justified by 
the consent of the parties. Just as the Virginia court cannot exceed the scope 
of Virginia’s sovereignty, so too the arbitrator cannot exceed the scope of the 
parties’ consent. 
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sovereign power to decide the applicable legal standards (i.e., its choice 
of law) is subject only to minimal scrutiny to prevent arbitrary decisions 
and to protect the defendant’s Due Process right to fair notice. Unlike 
in the regulatory and personal jurisdiction contexts, the geographical 
limitations of state sovereignty are not at play in choice of law. 
B. The Implications of a Regulatory Approach to  
Sovereignty in Specific Jurisdiction 
A regulatory model of sovereignty would place significant limit-
ations on when a state court could exercise specific jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant.111 In Healy v. Beer Institute,112 the Supreme 
Court held, not only that a state cannot directly regulate extraterritor-
ial conduct, but also that it may not regulate in-state conduct when 
doing so has the “practical effect” of controlling conduct that occurs 
wholly outside the state’s borders.113 A broad interpretation of this rule, 
however, would invalidate most run-of-the-mill state economic legisla-
tion, because most state legislation has some practical effects beyond 
 
111. These limitations apply only to regulations of out-of-state conduct. A state’s 
police power includes a general power to regulate in-state conduct, subject 
only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. This power to regulate 
in-state conduct corresponds to general jurisdiction over a domiciliary or in-
state corporation. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). This insight, 
however, does not resolve the difficult issue of when a corporation should 
be considered physically present in the forum. The Court’s most recent 
formulation, which allows general jurisdiction only when a corporation is “at 
home,” is one of many possible approaches to determine when a corporation 
is physically present or the equivalent of a domiciliary. Id. at 760. But see 
Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: 
General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 Ohio St. 
L.J. 101, 107 (2015) (asserting that Daimler “trespasses on the power of 
states”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 264–65 (“The state’s interest 
in protecting its citizens lies at the heart of the adjudicatory system; jurisdic-
tional limits that counteract the state’s ability to enforce its legislative 
priorities necessarily erode the judicial safeguards within our federal system.”). 
112. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
113. Id. at 336. Such indirect extraterritorial regulation provides the best analogy 
to personal jurisdiction. A state court is also unable to directly assert judicial 
power over an out-of-state defendant. A court in Virginia, for example, cannot 
unilaterally render and enforce a judgment against an unconsenting defendant 
in Maryland. Instead, the Virginia judgment would be directly enforceable 
only against the defendant’s assets in Virginia. If the plaintiff wanted access 
to the defendant’s assets in Maryland, he would need to ask a Maryland court 
to enforce the Virginia judgment. While the Maryland court must comply 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause—and thus the Virginia judgment 
would have practical effects in Maryland—the Virginia judgment has no 
direct coercive power outside of Virginia. 
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its borders.114 The lower courts have therefore narrowed the reach of 
Healy’s practical effects test. 
Although a full exploration of the constitutional limitations on 
extraterritorial state regulation is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
lower courts have generally found that, if a state law does have the 
practical effect of regulating extraterritorial conduct, the state must 
have a sovereign interest in the extraterritorial conduct being regulat-
ed.115 In National Electric Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell,116 for exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a Vermont 
law requiring that fluorescent light bulbs sold in Vermont be labeled as 
containing mercury.117 Citing Healy, the plaintiff light bulb manufact-
urers argued that the law would have the “practical effect” of forcing 
them to attach the Vermont label to light bulbs sold throughout the 
country due to their national distribution processes.118 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, held that the plaintiff’s “extraterritoriality contention 
fails because the statute does not inescapably require manufacturers to 
label all lamps wherever distributed.”119 The court explained: “To avoid 
the statute’s alleged impact on other states, lamp manufacturers could 
arrange their production and distribution processes to produce labeled 
lamps solely for the Vermont market and then pass much of the incr-
eased costs along to Vermont consumers in the form of higher prices.”120 
In other words, the Vermont law was constitutional because it only 
regulated out-of-state conduct associated with goods bound for Ver-
mont. The sovereign interests of Vermont—protecting the health, safe-
ty, and general welfare of its inhabitants—were clearly implicated by 
such conduct. 
 
114. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 379 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(Sutton, J., concurring) (“The modern reality is that the States frequently 
regulate activities that occur entirely within one State but that have effects 
in many.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1521 (2007) (“In practice, states exert regulatory 
control over each other all the time.”). 
115. For a more complete analysis, see Schmitt, Extraterritoriality, supra note 
64, at 877 (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritoriality 
doctrine); cf. Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity 
in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 855, 871 (2002) (“[S]tates fre-
quently have the power to exercise legislative jurisdiction over persons 
whose out-of-state activities undermine legitimate state interests.”). A 
sovereign interest is one tied to the state’s police powers to legislate for 
the safety, health, and general welfare of people within its borders. 
116. 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
117. Id. at 107. 
118. Id. at 110. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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Not only do other Circuit Court cases use the same reasoning as 
Sorrell,121 but this reasoning also helps to distinguish Supreme Court 
cases like Healy. In Healy, a Connecticut law required any out-of-state 
company that sold beer to Connecticut wholesalers to affirm to the 
state that it was not offering lower prices in any neighboring state for 
the next month.122 This law, the Court held, was unconstitutional be-
cause it had “the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity 
occurring wholly outside the boundary of the State.”123 Connecticut ess-
entially used in-state sales as a hook to regulate wholly out-of-state 
transactions: sales between out-of-state beer distributors to stores in 
other states.124 Unlike the lightbulbs bound for the Vermont market in 
Sorrell, Connecticut had no sovereign interest in beer sales to customers 
in another state. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent case on extraterritorial state 
regulation, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. 
Walsh,125 further supports this interpretation. In Walsh, Maine required 
drug companies to enter into rebate agreements with the state for drugs 
sold to Maine Medicaid patients. Under these rebate agreements, the 
drug companies paid a percentage of the revenue generated from sales 
in Maine to the state.126 This money was in turn given to pharmacies 
that agreed to sell the drugs at a discount to Maine residents.127 Because 
the out-of-state drug company plaintiffs in Walsh did not sell their 
products directly into Maine, but instead sold only to out-of-state 
wholesalers, they argued that the Maine plan had the practical effect of 
 
121. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995). 
122. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1989). 
123. Id. at 337. 
124. Unlike the light bulb manufacturer in Sorrell, the only way for the beer 
distributors in Healy to avoid the extraterritorial effect of Connecticut’s 
regulation was to stop selling goods in Connecticut. However, this was 
essentially an unconstitutional condition, because, under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the beer distributors have a right to sell their goods 
throughout the country. Connecticut therefore could not condition the exercise 
of this economic right on submission to a regulation of a wholly out-of-state 
transaction. For the Connecticut law to pass constitutional muster, the beer 
distributors would have had to have had some way to avoid the application 
of Connecticut’s regulation to wholly out-of-state transactions. 
125. 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
126. Id. at 670. See also Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug 
Plan and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: the Case of the Missing 
Link[age], 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 9 (2003). 
127. Denning, supra note 126, at 10. If a drug company did not agree to give the 
rebates, Maine subjected its drugs to a time-consuming and costly pre-approval 
process before its drugs could be prescribed to Maine Medicaid patients. Id. 
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regulating extraterritorial conduct, that is, the wholly out-of-state tran-
saction between the drug company and the wholesaler.128 
In Walsh, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld 
Maine’s regulation. The Court reasoned that Maine’s regulation “does 
not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its ex-
press terms or by its inevitable effect.”129 This statement, however, is 
not technically true, because the law does regulate the wholly out-of-
state transaction between the producer and the wholesaler. As the First 
Circuit’s reasoning below made clear, however, this out-of-state effect 
was not constitutionally problematic because Maine regulated only out-
of-state transactions concerning goods bound for Maine.130 In other 
words, Maine’s statute was constitutional because it exclusively applied 
to transactions in which Maine had a sovereign interest in protecting 
the health and welfare of its citizens. 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Rocky Mountain131 further 
illustrates that, in the regulatory context, the state must have a sov-
ereign interest, not only in the regulation, but also in the extraterritorial 
conduct being regulated. In Rocky Mountain, California enacted a regu-
lation designed to reduce carbon emissions associated with in-state fuel 
use.132 Under this regulation, all fuel sold within California was assigned 
a carbon intensity rating based on the emissions generated over the 
fuel’s lifecycle, including production, distribution, and ultimate use.133 
The state then placed economic incentives on companies selling fuel in 
California to minimize carbon intensity ratings.134 A group of out-of-
state companies involved in the production and distribution of ethanol 
challenged the regulation, claiming that it was unconstitutional because 
it had the effect of regulating their wholly out-of-state conduct.135 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, upheld the California regulation by reasoning 
that, while California “cannot peacefully impose its own regulatory 
standards on another jurisdiction,” the State “may regulate with refer-
ence to local harms, structuring its internal markets to set incentives 
 
128. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669–70. 
129. Id. at 669.  
130. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81–83 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
131. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
132. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38562(a) (West 2014). See Corey, 730 F.3d 
at 1080 (discussing the emissions standard at issue). 
133. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081. 
134. Id. at 1080. 
135. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
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for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in California.”136 In 
other words, the court found that California’s regulation was constitu-
tional because the plaintiffs’ out-of-state conduct implicated Californ-
ia’s sovereign interest in protecting its citizens. 
These cases illustrate the key difference between the choice of law 
model and the regulatory model of sovereignty. Under the choice of law 
model, a state court should have the power to exercise jurisdiction 
whenever it has an interest in the resolution of the case. The regulatory 
model, however, requires the state to have an interest in the out-of-
state conduct of the defendant. In Rocky Mountain, for example, alth-
ough California has a strong interest in reducing carbon emissions 
throughout the country to reduce global warming, such an interest 
would not justify California in applying its regulation to conduct wholly 
unconnected to the state. California presumably could not require out-
of-state companies that sell fuel in California to reduce carbon emissions 
with respect to unrelated sales in other states.137 Unlike in the choice of 
law context, a state can regulate extraterritorial conduct only when it 
has a sovereign interest in the out-of-state conduct being regulated. 
The state interest requirement is implicit in the nature of state 
sovereignty, or, in the words of the Court, “the autonomy of the indivi-
dual States within their respective spheres.”138 Without some limit-
ations on a state’s ability to use in-state conduct as a hook to regulate 
wholly out-of-state conduct, a state could exceed its sphere of sovereign 
power and regulate much of the country. With its massive market 
power, California, for example, could condition in-state sales on a com-
pany adopting sweeping environmental or labor standards for its nat-
ional operations. As detailed above, however, the state of California 
derives its sovereign power from the people of California, and the people 
of California lack the authority to set national policy. As the Supreme  
136. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1104. 
137. Such a regulation would resemble the price affirmation law at issue in Healy 
discussed at supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
138. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). Similarly, the Court in BMW 
stated: “We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and 
comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its 
laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other 
States.” BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Although the Court has based limitations on punitive damages in the Due 
Process Clause rather than the dormant Commerce Clause, see State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly 
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”), the Court’s limitations 
on punitive damages are based in the same fundamental federalism concerns. 
See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State 
Sovereignty, 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 13–30 (2004); Chad DeVeaux, Lost 
in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 1016 (2011). 
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Court has stated, “[n]o state can legislate except with reference to its 
own jurisdiction.”139 State sovereignty also precludes a blanket prohib-
ition on all regulations that have extraterritorial effects. Because most 
state regulations have effects far beyond their borders, a blanket pro-
hibition would prevent a state from using its police power to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, or, in other words, it would 
prevent the state from serving valid interests within the scope of its 
sovereign power. The cases balance these concerns by preventing a state 
from regulating conduct beyond its borders unless doing so is necessary 
to serve an interest within the scope of the sovereign power of the state. 
In this way, each state retains meaningful sovereign power without 
unduly infringing on the sphere of power of another state. 
Understanding the inherent limitations on extraterritorial state 
power illuminates the manner in which sovereignty influences the law 
of personal jurisdiction. Although sovereignty can explain the basic 
structure of the doctrine, it does not explain the full range of constitu-
tional restrictions imposed by the Court. By logical implication, when-
ever sovereignty does not justify the doctrine, some other value, such 
as consent or reciprocity, must be motivating the Court. 
Sovereignty helps to explain the minimum contacts requirement in 
specific jurisdiction. Scholars have debated whether the Court’s defend-
ant-centered approach to contacts is based on fairness to the defendant 
resulting from the receipt of benefits,140 state sovereignty,141 or an un-
thinking reliance on history.142 Those who turn to sovereignty contend 
that contacts ensure the state has a sufficient interest to adjudicate the 
 
139. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). 
140. Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. Fla. 
L. Rev. 293 (1987). 
141. Weinstein explains as follows: “Territorial-based rules, such as the ‘minimum 
contacts’ requirement, promote interstate federalism by ‘ensur[ing] that the 
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.’” Weinstein, 
supra note 10, at 213 n.171 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). Weinstein also states that ignoring 
sovereignty would “raise[] the question of why state borders remain a central 
feature of jurisdictional doctrine.” Id. at 213. See also Redish, supra note 7, 
at 1117 (“Accordingly, the requirement that there must always be ‘minimum 
contacts’ with the state of the forum cannot be explained in terms of fairness 
alone. Rather it must also be based on the notion that without ‘minimum 
contacts’ a state can have no interest that would justify its hearing the case.” 
(quoting Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1587, 
1591–92 (1978))). 
142. See Borchers, supra note 10, at 63 (asserting that “[i]n a certain sense 
. . . ‘[m]inimum contacts’ was a metaphor to explain the metaphor of corporate 
presence”). 
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case.143 But this intuition does not explain why the Court requires 
contacts between the state and the defendant rather than merely con-
tacts between the state and the controversy. Looking to the regulatory 
context provides the missing link. In that context, a state may not wield 
coercive power extraterritorially simply because doing so would serve a 
state interest; instead, the state must have an interest in the extra-
territorial conduct that is being regulated. As explained above, despite 
having a strong interest in global warming, California cannot use in-
state sales of ethanol as a hook to regulate how ethanol is produced and 
sold throughout the country.144 And yet, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
California may effectively regulate how ethanol that is sold in California 
was produced and distributed in other states.145 Just as the out-of-state 
party’s extraterritorial conduct must implicate an interest within the 
scope of the sovereign power of the state in the regulatory context, for 
a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defen-
dant must have engaged in conduct that implicated the state’s sov-
ereign authority. 
Although sovereignty explains why the defendant must have 
contacts with the forum state, it does not justify the Court’s further 
requirement that such contacts be “purposeful.” In the regulatory 
context, a state regulation is constitutional so long as the out-of-state 
conduct being regulated implicates the sovereign interests of the 
regulating state. The courts simply do not stop to inquire into the out-
of-state party’s purpose. In Sorrell, for example, when the Second Cir-
cuit upheld a Vermont labeling law that had the practical effect of 
regulating the out-of-state manufacturing of lightbulbs bound for the 
Vermont market, the court did not consider whether the manufacturers 
had purposely availed themselves of the Vermont market.146 The manu-
facturers’ purpose was not relevant to the issue of the state’s sovereign 
power to regulate for the protection of its residents. Similarly, in Rocky 
Mountain, the Ninth Circuit did not consider whether the ethanol pro-
ducers and distributors had the purpose of sending their products to 
California.147 No court has suggested that a state’s exercise of extraterri-
torial regulatory power is dependent on the regulated party’s purpose. 
As a matter of sovereignty, a state court should likewise have the 
power to exercise jurisdiction over an out-state-defendant that did not 
purposefully avail itself of the forum. A state must be able to wield 
coercive power that has effects beyond its borders in the modern world.  
143. See sources cited supra note 11. 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 131–137. For example, California could 
not tell an Ohio company that, if it wanted to sell ethanol in California, it 
must comply with California standards for the ethanol sold in all fifty states. 
145. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079–80 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
146. Nat’l Elec. Mfr. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001). 
147. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107.  
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As explained above, if a state lacked the power to regulate in-state 
conduct in a way that caused extraterritorial effects, state sovereignty 
would be eviscerated in our modern interconnected nation. And, if a 
state can pass a regulation that has the practical effect of regulating an 
out-of-state party without his consent or purposeful election of benefits, 
a state should be able to effectively require that same party to appear 
in court. State sovereignty simply supplies no reason to limit a state’s 
adjudicative power in a way that does not apply to its regulatory power. 
A deep look at sovereignty therefore highlights its influence on the 
blackletter doctrine. The doctrine’s requirement that the defendant 
have contacts with the forum is fully supported by sovereignty con-
cerns. Even if the Court adopted a minimalist view of fairness, as many 
scholars have advocated,148 sovereignty would thus nevertheless dictate 
that the contacts requirement remain. Sovereignty, however, does not 
explain the doctrine’s controversial purposeful availment requirement. 
Any justification for this requirement therefore must come from fairness 
concerns related to the Due Process Clause. 
IV. Nicastro and the Stream of Commerce 
This Article’s conclusions on the role of state sovereignty could help 
to bring clarity and coherence to the law of personal jurisdiction. Being 
able to identify which policy justification is at play—sovereignty or 
fairness—would go a long way towards helping the courts resolve a 
number of ambiguities in the doctrine. Because a full discussion of all 
unresolved issues within the law of personal jurisdiction is beyond the 
scope of this Article, this Section details how a regulatory approach to 
sovereignty could inform the stream of commerce issue that prompted 
the Court’s most recent debate over sovereignty in Nicastro. 
Robert Nicastro seriously injured his hand while using a metal-
shearing machine in New Jersey.149 The defendant, J. McIntyre Mach-
inery, Ltd., produced the machine in England and shipped it to an 
Ohio-based distributor that handled all of J. McIntyre’s U.S. sales.150 
The distributor then sold the machine to the plaintiff’s employer in 
New Jersey.151 The record showed that up to four other J. McIntyre 
machines were sold in New Jersey, but J. McIntyre did not directly 
advertise or promote its products in the state.152 Although J. McIntyre 
therefore did not specifically target New Jersey, it sold its products into 
the stream of commerce knowing they could end up in any U.S. state.  
148. See, e.g., Trammel, supra note 46, at 546–47. 
149. J. McIntyre Mach., LTD. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
150. Id. at 2786, 2796. 
151. Id. at 2791. 
152. Id. at 2790. J. McIntyre attended trade shows in several other states. Id. 
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In his plurality opinion in Nicastro, Justice Kennedy found that the 
court lacked jurisdiction because J. McIntyre had not purposefully 
availed itself of New Jersey. According to Kennedy, “[t]he defendant’s 
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the 
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it 
is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods 
will reach the forum State.”153 Kennedy therefore would have found 
jurisdiction only if J. McIntyre had specially designed its goods, specific-
ally marketed, or otherwise targeted New Jersey. Because J. McIntyre 
targeted the U.S. market in general rather than “engag[ing] in conduct 
purposefully directed at New Jersey,” Kennedy found that the New 
Jersey court lacked personal jurisdiction.154 
Kennedy strongly indicated that his restrictive approach to juris-
diction in the stream of commerce context was compelled by sovereign-
ty concerns. He began his discussion of jurisdiction by stressing the role 
of sovereignty. Comparing adjudicatory jurisdiction to regulatory juris-
diction, he stated:  
The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful 
power. This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign 
to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to 
the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those 
within its sphere.155  
Kennedy also called sovereignty a “central concept” in the law of 
personal jurisdiction and stated that “jurisdiction is in the first instance 
a question of authority rather than fairness.”156 He further criticized the 
dissent’s approach as being “inconsistent with the premises of lawful 
judicial power.”157 In fact, Kennedy’s opinion uses the words “sovereign-
ty” or “sovereign” seventeen times. 
And yet, despite all this talk of sovereignty, Kennedy’s opinion does 
not explain how sovereignty actually informs the blackletter doctrine. 
Kennedy cites Hanson for the proposition that “the sovereign’s exercise 
 
153. Id. at 2788. Kennedy also stated: “The question is whether a defendant has 
followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within 
the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to 
subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.” Id. at 2789. 
154. Id. at 2790. 
155. Id. at 2786–87 (citation omitted). 
156. Id. at 2788–89.  
157. Id. at 2789. Although Kennedy made this remark while commenting on 
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Asahi, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting 
opinion in Nicastro uses the same reasoning. Id. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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of power requires some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’”158 
Without any explanation, he then abruptly moves from “purposeful 
availment” to a discussion of when a defendant “may submit to a Sta-
te’s authority.”159 He ultimately concludes that, when a defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the forum, “it submits to the judicial power of 
an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised in 
connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the State.”160 
Purposeful availment, therefore, is significant for Kennedy because it 
indicates submission to jurisdiction. However, Kennedy made no attem-
pt to explain how sovereignty concerns dictate that a state may assert 
adjudicatory jurisdiction only over submitting defendants. 
Kennedy’s failure to tie his test to sovereignty is not surprising, 
because a state’s power is not limited to individuals who purposefully 
submit to its authority. In both the regulatory and adjudicatory con-
texts, state sovereignty includes power over out-of-state conduct that 
implicates the sovereign interests of the state. Here, the out-of-state 
conduct is the sale of goods into the stream of commerce, and the state 
has a sovereign interest in protecting its residents from unsafe or other-
wise defective goods and allowing its residents to be compensated for 
in-state injuries. As explained above, the manufacturer’s purpose or 
intent is irrelevant in the regulatory context. To regulate the in-state 
sales of products that were produced elsewhere, the state need not prove 
that the manufacturer somehow targeted the state.161 The manufact-
urer’s intent therefore should also be irrelevant to the scope of state 
sovereignty in the adjudicatory context. When a manufacturer sells a 
good knowing it may end up in a particular state, this conduct impli-
cates that state’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and general 
welfare of its inhabitants. If a state can indirectly regulate the manu-
facture of out-of-state goods bound for an in-state market, the state 
should also be able to hear cases arising from in-state sales. 
The court in Sorrell, for example, never stopped to ask whether the 
lightbulb manufacturers purposefully sold their products into Vermont. 
The labeling requirement applied to all lightbulbs sold in Vermont, 
regardless of whether the manufacturer directly sold into Vermont—
thus “submitting” to the regulation—or sold to an out-of-state distrib-
utor that then sold to buyers in Vermont. The court in Sorrell upheld 
the Vermont regulation because the lightbulb manufacturers could have 
avoided the extraterritorial effects of the regulation by selling different 
lightbulbs without the label to the rest of the country.162 In other words,  
158. Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 2787–88. 
161. See supra Part III.B. 
162. Nat’l Elec. Mfr. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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the regulation did not inescapably regulate any out-of-state conduct 
other than the sale of lightbulbs bound for Vermont. The regulation 
was constitutional—even though it had no purpose or intent require-
ment—because the manufacturers were not legally compelled to change 
their wholly out-of-state conduct as a condition of doing business in the 
state. 
Applying these principles to the stream of commerce context would 
support a broad approach to jurisdiction. Just as a state is free to reg-
ulate in-state conduct so long as it leaves the regulated party with the 
ability to structure its conduct to avoid any coercive out-of-state effects, 
a state’s assertion of sovereign power over a defendant in the adjudic-
atory context should be constitutional so long as the defendant was 
able to structure its conduct to avoid jurisdiction. Suppose a manufact-
urer in state X that sells its goods to a distributor in state Y is con-
cerned about the tort law of state Z. As a matter of contract law, the 
manufacturer could prohibit its distributors from selling into state Z or 
create a special (and presumably more expensive) product for sale in 
state Z that would meet state Z’s legal standards. A manufacturer faced 
with a stream of commerce issue is thus in a position that is analogous 
to the manufacturer of the lightbulbs in Sorrell. The court in Sorrell 
held that Vermont had the power to require that all lightbulbs sold in 
Vermont to have special labels because the manufacturers were not 
required to sell such lightbulbs in other states.163 The manufacturers 
could have elected to produce special lightbulbs only for the Vermont 
market, or, if compliance was too expensive, stop selling in Vermont. 
Vermont was therefore not exceeding its proper sphere of sovereign 
power. In the stream of commerce context, a court in state Z similarly 
would not exceed its sphere of adjudicatory power because the manu-
facturer in state X could have produced specialized goods for state Z or 
prohibited its distributors from selling in state Z. It would be incong-
ruous to allow Vermont to indirectly regulate out-of-state manufact-
urers while not allowing state Z to assert jurisdiction. When a defendant 
engages in conduct that implicates the sovereign interests of the forum 
but had a meaningful opportunity to avoid doing so, the state does not 
act beyond its proper sphere of sovereign authority by asserting juris-
diction over the defendant. 
Ironically, although Justice Ginsburg declared that state sovereign-
ty is not an appropriate consideration,164 sovereignty would actually 
support her approach to stream of commerce cases. In her dissenting 
opinion in Nicastro, Ginsburg stated that the defendant’s sales into the 
stream of commerce with knowledge that the goods could reach the 
forum should be a sufficient contact to support jurisdiction.165 Unlike 
 
163. Id.  
164. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
165. Id. 
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Kennedy, she therefore would not require any additional conduct 
specifically targeted at the forum state. Because a state has a sovereign 
interest in a manufacturer’s sale of goods when it is reasonably 
foreseeable that they could reach the state regardless of whether the 
manufacturer purposefully targeted the forum, Ginsburg’s approach is 
fully consistent with the scope of state sovereignty. 
Recognizing that sovereignty does not compel Kennedy’s restrictive 
approach to stream of commerce jurisdiction makes it apparent that 
some other value must be at play. Kennedy’s focus on “submission” is 
likely based on substantive due process notions of fairness. Perhaps he 
means to say that a state court can exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant only if the defendant tacitly consented to jurisdiction.166 
Or, he may mean that jurisdiction is fair only when the defendant avail-
ed itself of some reciprocal in-state advantage.167 Under either theory, 
the constitutional value at play is a Due Process fairness requirement. 
In the stream of commerce context, this means that he would deny a 
convenient forum to an injured plaintiff because he thinks forcing a 
manufacturer to defend a lawsuit in a state where its products are sold 
would be so unfair that it violates Due Process. Although Kennedy 
attempts to pin this result on state sovereignty, substantive Due Pro-
cess fairness concerns are to blame.168 
Conclusion 
The scope of state sovereignty mandates that state courts do not 
have unlimited jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. Whereas the 
Constitution limits the powers of the federal government by subject 
matter, structural principles inherent in our federalist system dictate 
that state sovereignty is instead limited by geography. The scope of a 
state’s sovereign power should therefore be the same in the regulatory 
and adjudicatory contexts. And, just as the people of one state cannot 
regulate the entire country, they also cannot adjudicate all of the nat-
ion’s controversies. 
The constitutional limitations on a state’s extraterritorial regula-
tory power, which are wholly based on sovereignty concerns, help id-
entify sovereignty’s place within the law of personal jurisdiction. In the 
regulatory context, a state may indirectly regulate out-of-state conduct 
 
166. See sources cited supra note 8 (arguing that personal jurisdiction should be 
based on consent). 
167. See sources cited supra note 10 (arguing that personal jurisdiction should be 
based on reciprocity). 
168. Kennedy’s approach therefore fits within the Roberts Court’s pro-corporation 
constitutional jurisprudence. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against 
the Supreme Court 172–91 (2014). Although it is beyond the scope of 
this Article, similar analysis could be given for the Court’s recent decision 
in Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
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only when such conduct implicates the state’s sovereign interests in the 
health, safety, and general welfare of its residents. A state court’s 
adjudicatory power should therefore likewise be limited to defendants 
whose conduct invoked the state’s sovereign interests. The choice of law 
model, which would broadly allow jurisdiction whenever the state has 
an interest in the resolution of the case, does not fully account for the 
geographical limitations on state power. 
Applying these principles to Nicastro, the Court’s most recent deb-
ate over sovereignty, produces an interesting result. Although Justice 
Kennedy strongly implies that his limited reading of jurisdiction in str-
eam of commerce cases is compelled by sovereignty concerns, the state 
of New Jersey had a sovereign interest in the defendant’s conduct. 
Kennedy’s approach, therefore, must be based on something else. In all 
likelihood, the Court’s recent curtailment of specific jurisdiction is bas-
ed on a perceived need to shield corporate defendants from state courts 
as a matter of substantive Due Process. 
 
